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Keywords: target prices; forecast accuracy; analyst characteristics; institutional and regulatory 
differences across countries. 
Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text. 
                                                                
 We thank Michael Brennan, James Ohlson, and Steve Young, and participants at the 2011 European Accounting 
Association meeting, the 2011 Financial Management Association European meeting, and the 2012 Financial 
Management Association meeting for helpful comments. All errors and omissions are our own. Pawel Bilinski is from 
Lancaster University Management School, Danielle Lyssimachou and Martin Walker are from Manchester Business 
School. Contact details: p.bilinski@lancaster.ac.uk (P.Bilinski), danielle.lyssimachou@mbs.ac.uk (D.Lyssimachou), 




A target price (TP) forecast reflects the analyst’s estimate of the firm’s stock price level in 12 
months, providing easy to interpret, direct investment advice.1 Target prices are valuable to 
investors2, yet we know little about what determines TP accuracy. In particular, questions such as—
do analysts exhibit differential and persistent ability to issue accurate target prices after controlling 
for analyst earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast accuracy, and how institutional and regulatory 
differences across countries, e.g. differences in accounting disclosure quality, affect TP forecast 
accuracy—have received limited research attention. We examine the two set of factors together 
because quality of TP forecasts should reflect both the analyst forecasting skills and the quality of 
information signals analysts use to arrive at target prices, where the latter is largely determined by the 
institutional and regulatory environment the firm operates in (Hope 2003a, 2003b; Ball et al. 2000).3 
We confirm that TP accuracy varies with both the institutional setup that facilities the forecasting 
task and with superior analyst skillset, and that on average the former has a stronger effect on TP 
accuracy.  
Using data from 16 countries—the US, 12 European countries, Japan, Australia and Hong 
Kong—over the period 2002–2009, we study the determinants of analyst TP accuracy. We use two 
main TP accuracy measures. First, an indicator variable that equals one if the TP forecast is met by 
the actual stock price over the 12-month period after the forecast issue, Met_any. We document that 
during the 12-month forecast period the stock price reaches the target price in 59.1% of cases, with 
Italian firms having the lowest proportion of met TPs, 54.0%, and Australian firms the highest, 
                                                                
1 Our email correspondence with Thomson Reuters IBES support team and Daniel Reingold, a former top analyst at 
Credit Suisse First Boston, confirm that a target price reflects the level at which the analyst believes the stock price will  
trade at the end of a specific, usually a 12-month horizon.  
2 Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith et al. (2005) document strong incremental price reaction to TP revision 
announcements in the US, controlling for concurrent stock recommendation and earnings-per-share revisions.  
3 An important benefit of the international setting is that we can achieve a high variation in analyst forecasting 
environments largely without the cost of high endogeneity. This provides better specification of tests that examine 
analyst differential TP forecasting ability in relation to the forecasting environment.  
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66.1%. Our second TP accuracy measure is the absolute difference between the TP forecast and the 
stock price at the end of the forecast horizon scaled by the stock price at the forecast issue date, 
aTPE. The mean absolute TP error is 44.7%, ranging from 37.3% for Japanese firms to 58.2% for 
Danish companies. The distribution in TP accuracy measures remains qualitatively the same when 
we recalculate Met_any and aTPE using a shorter forecast period to account for TP revisions made 
before the end of the 12-month forecast period. 
We examine analysts’ differential and persistent ability to issue accurate target prices in two 
steps. First, we compare the accuracy of analyst TPs to the accuracy of simple price forecasts that 
investors can form based on information available at the TP issue date. If the accuracy of simple 
price forecasts is higher than that of analyst TPs, the latter offer no value to investors. We find that 
on average analyst TP forecast accuracy is higher than the accuracy of a naïve price forecast, which 
predicts that the stock price in twelve months will be equal to the stock price on the forecast issue 
date times one plus the previous 12-month firm buy-and-hold return. Specifically analyst TPs meet 
or exceed the accuracy of naïve price forecasts in 74.5% of cases, and the analysts’ absolute TP 
forecast error is 9.8% lower compared to the absolute forecast error of the naïve price forecast. The 
accuracy of analyst TPs is also superior to other simple price forecasts such as those formed based 
on the industry price-to-earnings ratios and the market return over the preceding 12-month period.   
Second, multivariate analysis shows that analyst characteristics associated with superior 
forecasting skill predict TP accuracy. Analyst firm-specific forecasting experience reduces the TP 
forecast error, which means that analysts learn to produce more precise TPs over time for the firms 
they follow. However, analyst experience has no effect on the likelihood that a target price is met 
over the 12-month forecast horizon. Analysts following more firms issue more accurate TPs based 
on both TP accuracy measures. This is consistent with the international evidence on EPS forecast 
accuracy in Clement et al. (2003) and Bolliger (2004), and points to the existence of information 
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spill-over effects from following multiple firms. Further, analysts who cover firms located in fewer 
countries—country specialized analysts—are more accurate TP forecasters. The evidence that 
country-specialization improves TP accuracy complements the results in Sonney (2009), who reports 
that country-specialized analysts produce more accurate EPS forecasts. Target prices made by 
analysts employed by large brokers, who have access to a greater resource pool, are more likely to be 
met over the 12-month forecast period. Finally, looking at the persistence in analyst TP forecasting 
ability, we find that better past TP forecasters issue more accurate future TPs. 
The relation between analyst characteristics and TP accuracy remains qualitatively similar 
when we recalculate Met_any and aTPE to account for TP revisions made before the end of the 12-
month forecast period (Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev). For aTPE_rev, we also observe that TPs issued 
by analysts employed by larger brokers have lower TP error. Together, the results confirm that 
better quality analysts have persistent and differential ability to issue precise TP forecasts. 
Institutional and regulatory environment shows a strong association with TP accuracy. For 
all accuracy measures, we find that TP forecasts are more accurate in countries with higher 
accounting disclosure quality.  For both Met_any and Met_any_rev, TP forecasts in countries where 
the legal system originates in common law are more likely to be met by the actual stock price 
compared to countries with civil law tradition. This supports the results in Clement et al. (2003) that 
the shareholder model of corporate governance in common law countries improves the quality and 
amount of information available to analysts, which facilitates their forecasting task. Cross-country 
differences in national culture explain variations in TP forecast accuracy. Specifically, TP estimates 
issued for firms that operate in countries with high uncertainty avoidance are on average more 
accurate. Uncertainty avoidance encourages less risk taking and stability in the working environment 
(Bontempo et al. 1997), which simplifies the analyst valuation and forecasting task when producing 
TPs. Further, Met_any shows a negative correlation with power distance, individualism, and 
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masculinity. These cultural dimensions associate with market-orientation of firms, high 
competitiveness of individuals, acceptance for risk, higher secrecy of managers and more difficult 
access to firm management for analysts—characteristics that reflect higher forecasting difficulty. 
Finally, we find that TP forecast accuracy improves after the mandatory IFRS adoption for the 
fourteen countries in our sample that implemented IFRS starting on January 2005.  
All regressions control for the accuracy of analyst EPS forecasts, which shows a positive 
association with TP forecast accuracy. This is consistent with better quality inputs into analyst 
valuation models improving TP accuracy. The regressions also include firm characteristics that could 
predict TP forecast accuracy, such as proxies for the quality of the firm’s information environment 
and analyst competition (firm market capitalization and the number of analysts covering the firm), 
firm total risk (stock price volatility), and predictable stock price patterns (price momentum). We 
also control for the magnitude of the forecasted stock price change, the ex-post stock market 
performance, industry and year dummies, and the effect of recent financial crisis. For the latter, the 
analysis reveals that TP forecast accuracy is lower in all countries we investigate during the financial 
crisis 2007–2009.  
Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. These include using instrumental 
variable analysis to adjust for endogeneity in the analyst’s projected price change estimate, using 
country fixed-effect regressions, and using the proportional mean absolute TP forecast error as in 
Clement (1999, 2003).  
This study will be of interest to both academic researchers and market participants. First, to 
date, the accuracy of target price forecasts has received limited attention by the literature. This is 
surprising considering that TPs provide more direct and granular investment advice to investors 
compared to earnings forecasts or stock recommendations. A recent review of the analyst 
forecasting literature by Bradshaw (2010) emphasizes this point. His literature search identifies only 
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14 papers on analyst target prices listed in ABI/INFORM, and only three that look at target prices 
and earnings forecasts together. In particular, of the three published studies that provide some 
evidence on TP accuracy, Asquith et al. (2005) report only summary statistics on TP accuracy, and 
Demirakos et al. (2010) and Bonini et al. (2010) do not examine whether analyst and broker 
characteristics determine TP accuracy. Bradshaw and Brown (2007), the only other study to examine 
persistence in analyst target price forecasting accuracy, find no link between past and current TP 
forecast accuracy in the US market over 1997–2002. Our study differs from Bradshaw and Brown 
(2007) as (1) we examine a more recent sample period, and (2) we focus on a broader set of analyst 
and broker characteristics in explaining differences in TP forecast accuracy.4 Furthermore, none of 
the previous studies explore whether differences in institutional and regulatory settings influence TP 
accuracy, nor do they control for the contemporaneous relation between EPS and TP accuracy. Our 
paper fills this gap in the literature and documents that analysts exhibit differential and persistent 
ability to forecast target prices accurately. Further, compared to previous research, our study tests 
the largest set of potential TP forecast accuracy predictors providing the most comprehensive 
analysis of TP forecast determinants to date.  
Second, this study is the first to provide evidence that institutional and regulatory differences 
between countries influence analysts’ ability to forecast accurate target prices. Specifically, we show 
that institutional factors such as the accounting disclosure quality, the corporate governance system, 
                                                                
4 Differences in sample periods and in model specification most likely explain the discrepancy between ours and results 
in Bradshaw and Brown (2007). First, new regulation introduced in the wake of the internet crash and Enron and 
World.com accounting scandals aimed to reduce conflicts of interests in analyst research and to promote less biased sell-
side equity research (e.g. NASD 2711 and the SEC rule 472 in the US). This may have motivated analysts to exert more 
effort to produce more accurate TP forecasts. Second, tests in Section VII show that the relation between past and 
current TP accuracy is strongly attenuated for TP forecasts issued during the financial crisis 2007–2009. This is because 
unexpected price decline as a result of subprime crisis had a strong negative effect on TP forecast accuracy. A similar 
price shock occurred in the aftermath of the internet bubble burst, a period Bradshaw and Brown (2007) draw majority 
of their TP forecasts from (forecasts issued after 2000 make up 64.5% of all TPs in their sample). Third, we find that for 
TPs issued for US firms only, the coefficient on past TP accuracy is lower by 14.3% in magnitude for the Met_any 
regression and by 6.4% for aTPE regression when we use the TP accuracy model specification in Bradshaw and Brown 
(2007) compared to our model specification. 
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cultural traits, and IFRS regulation affects uncertainty analysts face in forecasting future firm value. 
This adds important evidence to the literature on the effects the country’s institutional setup has on 
capital markets, and in particular, on the properties of analyst research forecasts other than one-year 
ahead EPS (Basu et al. 1998; Clement et al. 2003; Hope 2003a, 2003b). For example, Hope (2003b, 
237) emphasizes that “[A]lthough accounting researchers extensively explain variations in disclosure 
levels among firms and countries, research on the effects of differences in disclosure levels [on 
capital markets] is more limited, especially in international settings (Saudagaran and Meek [1997])”. 
Thus our study responds to the call by Ramnath et al. (2008, 68), who state that “[F]inally, we expect 
to see more international research describing the institutional and regulatory factors that  create 
cross-country differences in the role of analysts and the properties of their forecasts”.5 
Third, the study has important implications for finance and accounting research that 
employs target prices: (1) to estimate the equity cost-of-capital (Brav et al. 2005; Botosan and 
Plumlee 2002, 2005; Botosan et al. 2011), or (2) as a predictor of within-industry variation in stock 
mispricing (Da and Schaumburg 2011). First, identifying more accurate target prices can increase the 
precision of the cost-of-capital estimates. Second, tests of association between the equity cost-of-
capital proxies derived from target prices and other variables, e.g. firm size in Brav et al. (2005) and 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002, 2005), are subject to the classic error-in-variables problem. 
Consequently, we advocate that future research in this field controls for TP accuracy when 
estimating the equity cost-of-capital to ensure the consistency of estimates in the subsequent 
analysis. Further, studies that derive equity cost-of-capital estimates from TPs implicitly assume (but 
do not test) that analyst TPs reflect market expectations and that TP forecasts are superior to simple 
                                                                
5 Our findings should also be of interest to regulators, as TP forecast precision may reflect the level of informational 
efficiency of a market and the efficacy of local regulation. Particularly, the evidence that the introduction of IFRS has 
improved analysts’ ability to forecast accurate TPs contributes to the international debate on the capital-markets 
consequences of this regulation (Byard et al. 2011; Horton and Serafeim 2010; and Preiato et al. 2010). 
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benchmarks based on past price performance (e.g. past realized returns). Our study provides 
evidence in support of the latter assumption.  
Fourth, the findings are valuable to investors, allowing them to improve their capital 
allocation decisions by attaching higher weight to TP forecast revisions by more accurate TP 
forecasters. Our results also explain why we should find differences in the usefulness of target prices 
to investors across countries. In particular, the results are relevant for studies on the information 
content of target prices, as the market reaction to TP revisions should be a function of the forecast 
information content and the forecast precision, and for studies on the long-term investment value of 
analyst TPs.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
and Section 3 outlines the research design. We describe the data in section 4, and Section 5 reports 
the empirical results. Section 6 presents the sensitivity analysis. We explore whether analysts can 
persistently issue more accurate target prices in Section 7 and section 8 shows the effect of IFRS 
adoption on TP forecast accuracy.  We conclude in Section 9.  
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section first outlines the previous TP accuracy studies that followed from the literature on EPS 
forecast precision.6 This is followed by a review of studies that examine the relation between EPS 
forecast accuracy and the institutional and regulatory setting that firms operate in. 
Compared to EPS forecast accuracy studies, the literature on target price accuracy is much 
more recent and substantially less populated. In the US market, Asquith et al. (2005) report that 
                                                                
6 For a comprehensive overview of EPS forecast accuracy studies, see Schipper (1991) and Brown (1993) who review the 
early literature in the field, Ramnath et al. (2008) who review the analyst forecasting literature since 1992, and Bradshaw 
(2010) for the most recent survey of the literature. As the accuracy of stock recommendations is difficult to quantify, the 
research on stock recommendations is centered on their investment value (Womack 1996; Mikhail et al. 2004), and their 
relation to EPS accuracy (Loh and Mian 2006). 
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54.3% of target prices by All American analysts made during 1997–1999 are achieved by the stock 
price by the end of the 12-month period, and the proportion of met TPs decreases with the forecast 
boldness, i.e. the magnitude of the projected price change. Asquith et al. find no relation between 
target price accuracy and the valuation model that analysts use to justify target price forecasts. 
Bradshaw and Brown (2007) study the persistence in analyst TP forecasting accuracy in the US over 
the period 1997–2002. They find that 45% of target prices in their sample are met during the 12-
month forecast period, but find no evidence that analysts have persistent ability to forecast accurate 
target prices. Bradshaw and Brown argue that target price accuracy does not factor into analyst 
compensation or career prospects, thus analysts have no incentive to issue accurate TPs. In another 
study, Gleason et al. (2008) find a positive association between concurrent earnings forecast 
accuracy and the investment value of target prices, which highlights the potential link between EPS 
and TP accuracy. 
The international evidence with respect to target prices is equally limited. In an Italian study, 
Bonini et al. (2010) report that target price inaccuracy is larger for TPs predicting strong price 
increases, for larger firms, for loss-making ones, and for stocks with better analyst coverage and 
stronger momentum. Demirakos et al. (2010) find that after controlling for the difficulty of the 
valuation task, TPs derived from discounted cash flow valuation models are relatively more accurate 
than TPs produced from price-to-earnings multiples for one out of four TP accuracy measures, 
using a sample of 94 UK firms during the period 2002–2004. None of the previous studies examine 
whether analysts exhibit differential and persistent ability to issue accurate target prices, controlling 








The relation between the institutional and regulatory setting and analyst EPS forecast 
accuracy 
The evidence on how differences in institutional and regulatory settings across countries, e.g. 
differences in reporting quality, affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts is limited. Basu et al. (1998) 
were among the first to examine the effects that country-differences in accounting disclosure have 
on EPS forecast accuracy. Using a sample of ten countries over 1987–1994, they report that 
countries with more frequent and higher quality disclosure have greater earnings forecast accuracy. 
Similarly to Basu et al., Hope (2003a, 2003b) reports that the consensus one-year ahead EPS forecast 
accuracy improves with high accounting disclosure quality for a sample of 18 and 22 countries 
respectively. Hope (2003b) also shows that the EPS forecast error is lower in countries with strong 
enforcement of accounting standards. Hope (2003b) concludes that higher quality disclosure 
increases analysts’ understanding of the firm’s current and future performance, and stronger 
enforcement is more likely to ensure that managers comply with accounting rules, which reduces the 
uncertainty that analysts face about managers’ accounting choices in financial statements. However, 
contrary to Hope (2003a, 2003b), Preiato et al. (2010) find a negative relation between EPS forecast 
accuracy and a self-constructed enforcement index that measures the country’s auditing and 
accounting enforcement.  
Ball et al. (2000) distinguish between the shareholder model of corporate governance that 
dominates in common law countries and the stakeholder model in code law countries. The former 
corporate governance system increases investor demand for analyst information and encourages 
more extensive firm accounting disclosure. The stakeholder governance model is characterized by 
lower demand for public discourse and strong insider communication between management and 
various stakeholder groups. Clement et al. (2003) report a stronger relation between broker size and 
relative EPS forecast accuracy in common law countries as analysts lever on the large brokers’ 
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resource pool and the privileged access to management in translating firm mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure into earnings forecasts.   
 The cultural environment firms operate in can affect analyst and managerial risk attitudes 
and choices7, orientation on long- vs. short-term goals and growth (Hofstede 1993, 1994), as well as 
firm financial disclosure (Gray, 1998). Using a sample of 10 countries, Clement et al. (2003) report 
that analyst general experience has a negative effect on relative EPS forecast accuracy in collectivistic 
countries, but does not affect relative EPS forecast error in individualistic countries. They attribute 
this result to the emphasis on life-time employment in collectivistic countries, which leads to 
entrenchment and reduces incentives for experienced analysts to produce accurate forecasts.  
To date, no prior study has investigated how variations in institutional and regulatory 
settings across countries influence TP accuracy. This evidence is important because compared to 
one-year ahead EPS forecasts, target prices also incorporate the analyst’s long-term assessment of 
firm earnings and of firm risk. Regulatory and institutional differences across countries can affect 
analysts’ ability to forecast future earnings and risk, having an incremental effect on TP accuracy 
beyond their effect on EPS forecast accuracy.  
  
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
We employ two main measures to capture analyst target price accuracy. The first measure is an 
indicator variable (Met_any) which is equal to one if the actual stock price, P, reaches the target price, 
TP, at any time over the 12-month forecast horizon, and zero otherwise. Met_any is constructed as 
follows:    
                                                                
7 Bontempo et al. (1997) find that cross-cultural difference affect risk perception of university students from the US, the 
Netherlands, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Kogut and Singh (1988) find that firms from cultures high in uncertainty 
avoidance prefer joint-ventures over acquisitions as the former avoids uncertainty about cost and success likelihood of 
firm integration.  
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for 1 0 : _ 1 if 0 12-month forecast horizon ,
_ 0 otherwise 
for 1 0 : _ 1 if 0 12-month forecast horizon ,
_ 0 otherwise 
s
s
TP Met any TP P
P
Met any
TP Met any TP P
P
Met any
    

    

    (1) 
where Ps is the stock price on the forecast issue date. Met_any provides a simple measure of TP 
accuracy, but ignores the magnitude of the forecast error. For example, a “conservative” forecast 
that predicts a small price increase is more likely to be met over the 12-month period, but may 
strongly deviate from the actual stock price at the end of the forecast period.  An investor following 
a limit-order strategy of selling a stock when it reaches the target price may have to forsake a larger 
proportion of a potential profit for a “conservative” forecast compared to a “bolder” forecast that is 
closer to the actual stock price at the end of the forecast period.       
The second TP accuracy measure, aTPE, measures the magnitude of the forecast error. 
aTPE is the absolute difference between the target price and the actual price at the end of the 12-







                               (2) 
Intuitively, aTPE reflects the investment error for a limit-order trading strategy. The actual price 
overshooting the target price reflects the loss of (potential) income from not holding the stock for 
the entire 12-month period; the actual price below the TP shows the difference between the actual 
and the expected payoff when holding the stock for 12-months. The absolute TP forecast error 
reflects that TPs far above the actual price are equally inaccurate as forecasts far below the stock 
price.  
The two TP accuracy metrics, Met_any and aTPE, capture forecast accuracy during the 12-
month forecast period and at the end of the 12-month forecast period respectively, providing a 
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more complete assessment of analyst forecasting accuracy compared to using only one forecast 
accuracy measure, as is common in EPS accuracy studies 
 A TP forecast revision made before the end of the 12-month forecast horizon of the 
preceding TP means that the preceding TP forecast becomes stale. If the magnitude and the 
direction of the new forecast differ from the preceding TP, leaving the forecast horizon of the 
preceding TP intact is likely to negatively bias TP accuracy estimates. To account for TP revisions 
made prior to the end of the 12-month forecast period, we construct a variation of our two main TP 
accuracy measures. We calculate an indicator variable called TP-revision-adjusted Met_any, i.e. 
Met_any_rev, which is equal to one if the actual stock price, P, reaches the target price, TP, over the 
actual forecast period, i.e. the period from the forecast issue date to the forecast revision date. 
Met_any_rev measure is defined as:  
    

    

for 1 0 : _ _ 1 if 0 actual forecast horizon ,
_ _ 0 otherwise 
for 1 0 : _ _ 1 if 0 actual forecast horizon ,
_ _ 0 otherwise 
s
s
TP Met any rev TP P
P
Met any rev
TP Met any rev TP P
P
Met any rev
    (3) 
If an analyst does not revise her TP forecast over the 12-month forecast period after the TP issue, 








      (4) 
where Prev is the stock price at the TP revision date. If an analyst does not revise her TP forecast over 
the 12-month period after the issue, aTPE_rev = aTPE. Using a simple example, we illustrate the 








To explain differences in target price accuracy across analysts, we use analyst and broker 
characteristics that previous studies associate with EPS forecast accuracy. This is because TP and 
EPS forecast accuracy predictors are likely to be correlated as they reflect, primarily, analyst 
forecasting skill. We also identify variables related to the country’s institutional and regulatory setting 
that can explain between-country variations in TP accuracy. The set of controls include the accuracy 
of the EPS forecast, the projected stock price change, and other variables that could explain target 
price accuracy. For ease of exposition, we divide the independent variables into five categories: (1) 
analyst- and broker-specific variables, (2) institutional and regulatory characteristics, (3) EPS and TP 
forecast-specific, (4) firm-specific, (5) and other controls.  
 
Analyst and broker characteristics 
We identify four analyst characteristics that previous studies have associated with EPS forecast 
accuracy. We use analyst firm-specific forecasting experience (A_exp) as a proxy for analyst 
forecasting skill and knowledge gained over time (Clement 1999).8 We calculate the number of firms 
(A_#Firm) an analyst follows as Clement (1999) suggests that it is more onerous and complex to 
actively follow and produce research reports for a large number of companies. Clement (1999) finds 
that analysts who follow more firms produce less accurate EPS forecasts. However, Clement et al. 
(2003) and Bolliger (2004) find that outside the US market, analysts who follow more firms produce 
more accurate EPS estimates, which suggests that analysts may benefit from information spill-over 
effects from following multiple firms. Sonney (2009) reports that country-specialized financial 
analysts produce more accurate EPS. We count the number of countries (A_#Count) where the 
                                                                
8 We use analyst firm-specific experience because Clement (1999) reports that analyst firm-specific experience has a 
consistent positive relation with EPS accuracy compared to analysts general forecasting experience, which shows a 
negative relation with EPS accuracy in his early sample period and only a weak positive association with EPS forecast 
accuracy in the latter period.  
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firms followed by the analyst are domiciled to measure the analyst country specialization. The 
number of analysts employed by a broker (B_#Ana) reflects the amount of resources available to 
analysts. Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) find that analysts with access to a large resource 
pool issue more accurate EPS forecasts. 
 
Institutional and regulatory characteristics  
We use three variables to capture variations in the institutional and regulatory environment that may 
affect the average TP forecast accuracy. The disclosure index (Disclosure) and the index of 
enforcement of accounting standards (Enforcement) are from Hope (2003b) and capture country 
variations in the average firm reporting quality and enforcement of accounting standards, 
respectively. The disclosure index is based on aggregate annual financial statement disclosure scores 
from CIFAR (1993, 1995), and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards is based on a 
factor analysis of (1) country-level audit spending, (2) judicial efficiency, (3) rule of law, (4) insider 
trading laws, and (5) shareholder protection. We expect analysts to produce more accurate TPs for 
firms in countries with high accounting disclosure quality and enforcement. This is because high 
annual report disclosure should increase analysts’ understanding of firm current performance, future 
earnings outlook and risk, the projections analysts factor in to arrive at target prices.9 Strong 
enforcement of accounting standards encourages managers to consistently follow the prescribed 
accounting standards and reduces instances of reporting fraud (Hope 2003b), which can reduce the 
uncertainty that analysts face about managers’ accounting choices for the current and future 
earnings. This may simplify the valuation task analysts use to arrive at target price forecast. 
                                                                
9 For example, Hope (2003a) argues that management discussion and analysis in the annual report can aid analysts in 
understanding firm future plans and strategy, and information on planned capital investment can inform analysts about 
expected earnings growth.  
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We use four indicator variables for the origin of the country’s legal system (Legor UK, Legor 
GE, Legor FR and Legor SC) to control for quality of corporate governance across countries.10 Ball et 
al. (2000) argue that the shareholder governance model in countries with UK legal origin promotes 
more timely accounting systems and is characterized by higher investor demand for financial 
information, which encourages more voluntary disclosure. This in return should affects the amount 
and quality of information available to analysts about firm current and future earnings, their growth 
and risk that analysts use in forecasting target prices. Ownership concentration (Owner con) from La 
Porta et al. (1998) measures the proportion of shares owned by the three largest shareholders among 
the top ten largest privately owned (non-financial) firms in a given country. Ownership 
concentration may promote private channels of communication between managers and 
blockholders, at the expense of public disclosure (La Porta et al. 2000), which can increases the 
information acquisition costs for analysts. This can adversely affect the quality of inputs analysts use 
to arrive at target prices. Controlling for enforcement and disclosure, we expect analysts to produce 
more accurate TPs in countries with UK legal origin and in countries with more diffused ownership.  
We use Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to control for cultural difference between 
countries firms operate in. Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is the degree to which people prefer 
structured and predictable events over unstructured and uncertain events. Orij (2009) relates 
uncertainty avoidance to lower entrepreneurial risk and weaker market orientation of companies. 
Masculine cultures (MAS) are more assertive and success oriented, which reflects their market 
orientation as opposed to feminine societies that focus on social responsibilities, relationships and 
environment (Van der Laan Smith et al. 2005). Countries with high power distance (PDI) accept 
unequal, hierarchical power distribution that may discourage information sharing (Zarzeski, 1996). 
                                                                
10 We distinguish four legal systems because Ball et al. (2000) caution that dichotomous split into common/code law 
countries may obscure within differences in governance models in code law countries. 
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Individuals in individualistic societies (IDV) are more independent and self-reliant compared to 
collectivistic countries that emphasize consensus, inclusiveness, and lifetime employment. The job 
market in individualistic societies promotes individual achievement, stimulates competitiveness 
between individuals, and risk taking behavior (Schuler and Rogovsky, 1998; Kirkman and Shapiro, 
1997; Shupp and Williams 2008).11 We expect analysts to produce less accurate TPs for firms that 
operate in masculine, individualistic countries with high power distance and low uncertainty 
avoidance. This is because these national traits should associate with high competitiveness of 
managers, acceptance of uncertainty inherent in firm operations, secrecy, and more difficult access 
to firm management for analysts. Such a forecasting environment should increase analyst forecasting 
task leading to lower TP forecast accuracy.  
 
Other explanatory variables: EPS and TP forecast characteristics 
An EPS forecast is the main input into the valuation model used to produce a target price, 
independently of whether analysts uses simple heuristics, such as price-to-earnings ratios, to justify 
their target prices (Bradshaw 2002) or more sophisticated models, such as the residual income model 
(Gleason et al. 2008). Further, Gleason et al. (2008) find that analyst EPS forecast accuracy positively 
correlates with the TP forecast investment value, which highlights the potential link between EPS 
and TP accuracy. If analysts do not exhibit differential ability to issue accurate target prices, TPs will 
only reflect the accuracy of earnings forecasts. We measure EPS forecast error (aEPS) as the 
absolute difference between the forecasted and actual earnings, scaled by the stock price at the end 
                                                                
11 The evidence on the relation between financial disclosure and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions is mixed. Zarzeski 
(1996) and Hope (2003) find a negative relation between disclosure and power distance, and Salter and Niswander (1995) 
report a negative relation between financial disclosure and uncertainty avoidance. However, Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) find a positive relation between disclosure and PDI and UDI. Hope (2003) and Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) report a negative relation between financial disclosure and masculinity, but Salter and Niswander 
(1995) find no relation between disclosure and MAS. Jaggi and Low (2000) report that controlling for legal origin of the 
accounting system, cultural environment has no effect on financial disclosure. 
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of the previous fiscal year. We use the ratio of the target price to the concurrent stock price at the 
TP issue date less one, to measure the projected stock price change (TP/P). TPs that are further 
away from the concurrent price are more difficult to be met by the actual stock price and are more 
likely to be ex-post inaccurate.  
 
Other explanatory variables: firm characteristics   
Firm characteristics include firm market capitalization (MV) and the number of analysts following a 
firm (F_#Ana), which proxy for the quality of the firm’s information environment and competition 
among analysts respectively. We expect analysts to produce more accurate forecasts for firms with a 
rich information environment and when competition among analysts is high. We use price 
momentum, MOM, to capture predictable price patterns. Continuation (reversal) in price 
momentum may increase (decrease) TP accuracy. We use stock price volatility scaled by the mean 
price level to measure firm total risk (COV).12 Option theory suggests that higher stock price 
volatility should increase the likelihood the stock price will meet the target price over the TP forecast 
horizon (Bradshaw and Brown 2007). At the same time, the absolute TP error should be larger for 
more volatile, i.e. less predictable, stocks.  
 
Other control variables and regression specification 
We use the performance of the leading market index for the (primary) exchange where the firm’s 
stock lists, over the 12 months after the TP issue date to capture the target price accuracy 
component that is due to the (random) ex-post performance of the equity market (Mkt ret). 
Unexpectedly poor (good) market performance means that TPs predicting a stock price decline 
(appreciation) will have a higher chance of being ex-post accurate, even if individual analysts have no 
                                                                
12 Using the stock price coefficient of variation (COV) to capture price variation adjusts for differences in price levels 
and currency across firms. 
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differential ability to forecast target prices accurately. A dummy variable (Fin cris) flags the recent 
financial crisis period. We mark the beginning of the financial crisis period in September 2007.13 The 
financial crisis continues until the end of our sample period. To control for time and industry 
effects, we include a set of annual dummies (Year dummies) and ten industry dummies (Industry 
dummies). Year dummies are for the TP forecast issue year. Industry dummies are based on the sector 
code from IBES SIG code. Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions. All continuous dependent 
and explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 The empirical specification of our multivariate regression that examines the determinants of 
TP forecast accuracy is: 
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  (5) 
where the Accuracy measure is one of the TP accuracy measures defined above, and ln denotes a 
logarithmic transformation of the variable.14 Also, in regressions where the TP forecast accuracy 
measures are adjusted for the actual length of the holding period (Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev), the 
return on the market index (Mkt ret) is calculated over the same period as the accuracy measures. 
                                                                
13 September 2007 is the month in which Swiss Bank UBS announced a third quarter pre-tax loss of $690 million and a 
$3.42 billion write-down of mortgage backed securities. Announcements of losses on mortgage backed securities by 
other large international banks followed shortly, leading to the subprime crisis. 
14 For aTPE, aTPE_rev, aEPS, and A_exp we use log 1 + corresponding variable to account for zero values. Log 
transformations ensure more normal distribution of the TP and EPS accuracy measures that have zero lower bound, 
which could bias OLS estimates. Logs of analyst and broker characteristics reflect that we should expect diminishing 
effect that analyst experience, firm and country following, and broker size have on TP accuracy. For example, the 
increase in TP forecast accuracy due to an increase in broker size by one analyst should be higher for small compared to 
large brokerage houses. Diminishing effect on accuracy also explains why we use logs of firm size and for the number of 
analysts following a firm.  
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IV. DATA AND SAMPLE 
Target price forecasts for firms domiciled in 16 countries are collected from the IBES International 
Detail files from January 1, 2002 to July 1, 2009.15 We select only target prices with a 12-month 
forecast horizon, and for firms where the actual stock price is non-missing for 12 months before 
and 12 months after the forecast issue date.  We retain target prices accompanied by one-year-ahead 
EPS forecasts, where the accompanying EPS forecast is issued within the past 90 days, and the TP 
issue date is prior to the EPS review date (the date on which the analyst last confirmed that her EPS 
forecast is still outstanding).16 Further, as in Clement (1999), we retain EPS and TP forecasts issued 
between 30 days and 330 days prior to the fiscal-year-end date. We use the US and international 
versions of the broker translation file to match broker names between the target price and EPS 
files.17 Analyst and broker characteristics are constructed using the IBES detail EPS file starting from 
January 1995, which avoids eliminating observations in the early sample to construct our explanatory 
variables and produces more reliable measures (Clement 1999). For non-US firms, stock prices, and 
the number of common shares outstanding for calculating firm market capitalization are from 
Datastream. For US firms, stock price data and the number of shares outstanding are from CRSP. 
Firm actual and forecasted earnings, and target prices are expressed in the company’s default 
currency assigned by IBES to every company under coverage.18 We exclude stocks where the default 
currency is different from the currency of actual stock prices. To ensure comparability across firms, 
                                                                
15 IBES international files are scarcely populated with target prices before 2002. The other commonly used source of 
target price data, First Call, was acquired by Thomson Reuters in June 2001 and was subsequently merged with IBES 
(verified by email correspondence with Thomson Reuters). First Call target price data was discontinued in 2004. 
16 Our correspondence with the IBES representative confirms that a TP forecast issued without an accompanying EPS 
forecast on IBES implies that the analyst considers her latest EPS forecast to be still outstanding, provided that the TP 
forecast is issued prior to the EPS review date. We use EPS at most 90 days prior to the TP forecast issue to eliminate 
stale EPS estimates. 
17 The broker translation file is from 2005, which eliminates broker houses covered by IBES after that date. We lose less 
than 4% of target price forecasts due to this limitation.  
18 According to IBES detail history user guide, all detailed estimates on IBES are provided in the default currency IBES 
allocates to each firm. This is usually the company’s reporting currency. All estimates received in a currency other than 




we convert firm market capitalization to USD. Our final sample includes 585,718 target price 
forecasts for 9,982 firms issued by 12,792 analysts employed by 621 brokers.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Table 2 describes the sample breakdown by country. The bottom raw “Total” shows the 
number of unique observations. Firms from the largest capital markets—the US, the UK and 
Japan—dominate the sample (69.9% of sample TPs), with US firms alone making up 55.2% of the 
sample target prices and 44.8% of the sample firms. Firms from the US and the UK enjoy large 
broker (324 and 190) and analyst coverage (5,040 and 2,240), consistent with New York and London 
playing a dominant role in international financial markets. The proportion of Hong Kong domiciled 
firms in the sample is similar to that of the more mature European markets, such as France and 
Germany, which reflects the importance of Hong Kong as a financial hub in Asia.   
 
Descriptive statistics for TP accuracy measures 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the analyst TP and EPS forecast accuracy 
measures. Across the pooled sample, 59.1% of TP forecasts are met at some point during the 12-
month forecast period. The lowest proportion of met TPs can be found in Italy (54.0%), while the 
highest proportion of met TPs is in Australia (66.1%) and Hong Kong (64.3%).19 The proportion of 
met TPs in the US is 54.7%, which is consistent with prior US evidence. The proportion of target 
price forecasts met at some point during the 12-month forecast period is 45% in Bradshaw and 
Brown (2007), who examine TP accuracy in the US over the period 1997–2002, and 54.3% in 
Asquith et al. (2005) for Institutional Investor All-American analysts in the US over the period 
                                                                
19 A contributing factor to the relatively high Met_any TP accuracy for Australian firms could be the commodity boom, 
which resulted in the Sydney All Ordinaries Index outperforming the S&P500 index by 4.2% p.a. over the period 
January 2002–January 2009. High TP accuracy for firms in Hong Kong is likely driven by the double-digit growth in 
China, with Hang Seng outperforming the S&P500 by 6.5% p.a. over the same period as above. This reflects the 




1997–1999. Our sample mean absolute TP forecast error is 44.7%, and ranges from 58.2% in 
Denmark to 37.3% in Japan. Mean aTPE in the US is among the highest in the sample at 49.5%, 
which mirrors the low frequency of met TPs in this market.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Using the TP-revision-adjusted Met_any, i.e. Met_any_rev, the average proportion of met TPs 
reduces to 43.4%. This reflects that, conditional on the magnitude of projected price change (TP/P), 
the TP forecast is less likely to be met by the actual stock price over shorter horizons. The lowest 
proportion of met TPs is found in the US (38.5%), and the highest proportion is found in Hong 
Kong (47.1%). Using the TP-revision-adjusted absolute TP error measure, aTPE_rev, the mean 
absolute forecast error reduces to 35.5%, compared to 44.7% for the aTPE measure, and is the 
highest in Denmark (47.3%) and the US (44.8%), and the lowest in Finland (30.0%).20 In unreported 
results, we find that the sample mean EPS error is 2.6% of the stock price at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. The lowest mean EPS forecast error is in the US, 1.6%, and is statistically lower 
compared to the mean EPS error for the remaining 15 countries based on a t-test and Wilcoxon test. 
This suggests that even though EPS forecasts are on average more accurate in the US, they do not 
necessarily translate into more accurate TPs.  
Panel B presents the average TP accuracy measures for each year in the sample. Met_any 
improves, in general, over the period 2002–2006, from 51.7% to 63.2%, but deteriorates during the 
financial crisis period 2007–2009. The dramatic recovery in Met_any during 2009 likely reflects the 
effect of the spring 2009 market rally. Average absolute TP error reduces from 51.9% in 2002 to 
                                                                
20 In unreported results, we find that the average singed TP error is 4.5%. The signed TP error is the highest in Italy 
(13.6%) and the lowest in Hong Kong (−11%). We do not use the signed TP forecast error as: (1) the signed TP error 
does not properly distinguish between more and less accurate analysts over our sample period because it averages out 
the low or negative TP error over the boom years (2003–2007) and the positive TP error due to the financial crisis, and 
(2) previous EPS accuracy studies use absolute EPS error to measure forecast precision.  
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35.1% in 2006, and levels out at 54.2% over 2007–2009. The patterns for Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev 
mirror that of Met_any and aTPE respectively.  
Panel C evaluates the correlation coefficients among the various TP forecast accuracy 
measures. There is a strong positive correlation between Met_any and Met_any_rev (0.726) and 
between aTPE and aTPE_rev (0.744), which suggests that TP revisions have little effect on the 
construct validity of our main TP accuracy measures. Consequently, the specification of the TP 
accuracy measures should have relatively little influence on the validity of our inferences. Further, 
the indicator and continuous TP forecast accuracy measures are significantly correlated, which 
indicates that they capture complementary dimensions of TP accuracy.  
 
Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the explanatory variables. Averages are calculated at TP 
forecast level, i.e. using characteristics measured at each TP forecast issue. The average analyst firm-
specific forecasting experience is slightly over 2.8 years, and analysts following US and Japanese 
firms have the longest mean experience following a firm (3.219 and 3.532 years). Also, analysts 
following US and Japanese firms produce research reports for the largest number of firms (around 
14 firms) compared to the pooled sample mean of slightly over 9 firms. On average, Dutch firm 
analysts follow companies from over 2.3 countries, which likely reflects the relatively small domestic 
equity market in the Netherlands. Analysts for US, Australian, and Japanese firms show the highest 
country-specialization as they are the least likely to forecast across multiple countries. The average 
broker size is 98 analysts. The UK has the highest accounting disclosure index (0.831) and Austria 
the lowest (0.607). The mean ownership concentration index is 0.375, and the US has the most 
dispersed ownership structure. Italy and Spain have the lowest values of the enforcement index 
(−3.55 and −3.65 respectively), and the US and the UK the highest (1.21 and 1.16 respectively). A 
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quarter of countries in the sample have the common law origin of the accounting system, and Hong 
Kong and France have the highest power-distance indexes (68).  The country scoring the highest on 
individualism is the US (91), and on uncertainty avoidance is Belgium (94). Japan has the highest 
masculinity index.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that on average, analysts project a 15.9% increase in the stock 
price over the next 12 months, with TP/P ranging from 22.4% for Swiss firms to 9.1% for firms 
domiciled in Belgium. The mean TP/P ratio for US firms is 19.7%, which is considerably lower 
compared to earlier US evidence (30.9% during 1997–2002 in Bradshaw and Brown, 2007, and 
32.9% during 1997–1999 in Asquith et al., 2005). The lower projected price increase found in our 
sample for US firms may reflect the effect of the NASD 2711 regulation and the SEC rule 472 
introduced in 2002. The rules were intended to reduce conflicts of interests in analyst research and 
promote less biased sell-side equity research. These rules prohibit members of the NASD and 
NYSE from tying analyst compensation to the broker’s investment banking transactions and from 
offering favorable research to a firm as an incentive to elicit future investment banking business. 
Even though the regulation was specific to the US market, it is likely that global brokerage houses 
implemented these rules across their US and overseas divisions.  
The mean firm capitalization is $10,037.1m, and sample firms are followed on average by 
approximately 16 analysts.21 Target prices are released following an average 0.6% decline in the stock 
price over the prior 90 days, while the prior one-year mean stock (standardized) price volatility 
preceding the TP issue is 7.7%. The mean market return is 5.2% for the 12-month period following 
the TP forecast issue and reduces to 2.7% when truncating the returns on the TP revision date 
                                                                
21 Firms domiciled in Europe have on average larger capitalization compared to US stocks, which reflects that a larger 
proportion of smaller firms list on the exchange in the US than in other markets (Fama and French, 1998, 2008). 
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(results untabulated). Finally, 45% of TP forecasts have been issued during the financial crisis. 
Overall, Table 4 shows that our sample reflects a variety of institutional settings and that there is a 
strong variation in analyst, broker and firm characteristics. Consequently, our sample provides an 
ideal research setting to test for determinants of within- and across-country variations in TP forecast 
accuracy. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We examine analysts’ ability to issue accurate target price forecasts in two steps. First, we compare 
the accuracy of analyst TPs to the accuracy of simple price forecasts that investors could form based 
on the information available at the TP issue date. If the accuracy of simple price forecasts is higher 
than that of analyst TPs, the latter offer no value to investors. Second, to examine if analysts have 
differential ability to produce accurate target prices, we estimate the TP forecast accuracy model 
specified in equation (5).  
 
Do analyst TP forecasts beat simple price forecasts based on past stock performance? 
This section examines if analyst TPs beat the accuracy of simple price forecasts based on the 
information available at the TP issue date. A simple Bayesian forecast extrapolates past stock 
performance into the future and is our naïve price forecast, which we pitch against analysts’ TP 
forecasts.  
 Table 5 compares the accuracy of analysts’ TPs to the accuracy of naïve price forecasts 
across the 16 countries in our sample. The naïve price forecasts predict that the stock price in 12 
months will be equal to the stock price at the forecast release date times one plus the previous 12-
month buy-and-hold return, naïve price forecasts. For each naïve price forecast, we calculate the four TP 
accuracy measures from Section 3, naive Met_any, naive aTPE, naive Met_any_rev and naive aTPE_rev. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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The second column of Panel A presents the proportion of analyst TPs that meet or exceed 
the accuracy of naïve price forecasts. We find that, on average, analyst TPs meet or exceed the accuracy 
of simple price forecasts in 74.5% of cases. The highest proportion of analysts TPs that meet or 
exceed naïve price forecasts is for firms in Hong Kong and the lowest is for Italian firms. The fourth 
column shows that analysts’ absolute TP forecast error is 9.8% lower compared to the absolute 
forecast error of a naïve forecast.22 The difference between TP error and the error of the naive price 
forecasts, aTPE − naive aTPE, ranges between −19.9% for firms domiciled in Hong Kong and zero 
for Danish firms. The differences in forecast accuracy between the TP-revision-adjusted TP 
measures and the naïve price forecasts show a similar pattern to that of our main TP accuracy 
measures.  
 We perform five further sensitivity tests (results untabulated). First, we remove the top 5% 
of stocks with the highest price momentum before the forecast issue. This examines if naïve price 
forecasts pick up the momentum effect, which could bias the results in Table 5 in favor of analyst 
superiority. The mean difference between the TP error and the error of the simple price forecasts 
reduces to −7.67%, but still remains highly significant. The conclusions are unchanged when we use 
a 10% cut-off point. Second, we remove the top 5% of naive aTPE to test if the results are affected 
by extreme naive price forecasts due to potential data errors. The results for this subsample remain 
qualitatively similar to that in Table 5. Third, we use returns excluding dividends to form naïve price 
forecasts, which should more closely correspond to the analyst forecasted (ex-dividend) target prices. 
Analyst TPs meet or exceed the accuracy of (ex-dividend) naïve price forecasts in 73.9% of cases and 
the mean analyst TP error is 9.4% lower than the error of (ex-dividend) naïve price forecasts. Fourth, we 
form the naïve price forecast based on the (country-specific) industry mean P/E ratio, calculated at 
                                                                
22 The results are unchanged when we compare the median difference between aTPE and the naïve price forecast error, 
which is −7.02% for the pooled sample and negative in all countries we investigate.  
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the forecast issue, times the analyst one-year ahead EPS estimate. This is because Bradshaw (2002) 
reports that analysts frequently compute target prices using simple heuristics, such as P/E ratios. If 
analysts simply convert their current EPS estimates into target prices using simple heuristics, TPs 
should not offer any incremental value to investors beyond EPS forecasts. The mean (median) 
difference between TP error and the error of the price forecasts from the P/E ratios is −77.2% 
(−44.0%), which shows that (1) analyst TPs are not simple transformations of analyst EPS forecasts 
and that (2) analyst TPs are more accurate than heuristic-based price forecasts using P/E ratios.23  
As a fifth sensitivity test, we examine if analyst TPs beat index price forecasts which predict that 
the stock price in 12 months will be equal to the stock price at the forecast release date times one 
plus the return on the market index over the preceding 12 month period. Index price forecasts 
impose less data requirements and are less affected by individual stock price momentum or data 
errors. We find that, on average, analyst TPs meet or exceed the accuracy of the index price forecast in 
74.1% of cases based on Met_any, and the mean (median) analyst TP error is lower than that of index 
price forecast in eleven (thirteen) countries. In the analysis, we do not consider martingale price 
forecasts that predict that a stock price in 12 months’ time is equal to the stock price today. This is 
because in efficient markets, investors require a premium for holding stocks (risk free rate plus beta 
times the market premium). Only stocks with negative market beta that would offset the risk free 
rate would justify using a martingale benchmark. Consequently, martingale price forecasts are 
unlikely to be used by investors.  
Based on the results in Table 5 and the further sensitivity tests, we conclude that, on average, 
analyst TP accuracy exceeds that of naïve price forecasts. This means that investors are better off 
following analyst target prices compared to naïve price forecasts.  
                                                                
23 The error of the price forecasts from the P/E ratios is winsorized at 5% to eliminate extreme naïve price forecasts due 
to potential data errors. Also, in calculating P/E ratios we exclude stocks with zero earnings, which reduces the sample 
to 552,165 observations. 
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The determinants of TP forecast accuracy 
Next, we examine if analysts have differential ability to produce accurate target prices based on 
regression model in equation (5). The first columns of Table 6 report the regression results for the 
main TP accuracy measures (Met_any and aTPE) and the latter columns describe results for the two 
TP-revision-adjusted TP accuracy measures (Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev). The Exp.sign column 
specifies the predicted coefficient signs, while the St.Eff column provides the standardized 
coefficient estimates, i.e. the effect that a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable 
has on the TP accuracy measure. The regressions use firm- and analyst- dual clustered standard 
errors as in Petersen (2009) to control for the cross-sectional dependence of observations. In 
reviewing the results, we first discuss the evidence on analysts’ differential ability to forecast accurate 
target prices. This is followed by the review of the results on the relation between institutional and 
regulatory characteristics and TP accuracy. 
 
Do analysts have differential ability to forecast accurate target prices? 
For our main TP accuracy measures, Table 6 indicates that TPs issued by analysts with higher firm-
specific experience have lower error. This confirms that analysts learn to produce more accurate TPs 
over time, as their forecasting experience for the firms they follow increases. However, analyst 
experience does not correlate with the likelihood that the actual stock price will meet or surpass the 
target price. Analysts following more firms issue more accurate TPs based on the two main TP 
accuracy measures, which suggests that information spill-over effects from following multiple firms 
improves TP accuracy. This complements the international evidence in Clement et al. (2003) and 
Bolliger (2004), who find that analysts who follow more firms produce more accurate EPS forecasts. 
Country-specialized analysts are more likely to issue more precise TPs, and TPs by analysts 
29 
 
employed by large brokers are more likely to be met by the actual price.24 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
The regression results for the TP-revision-adjusted TP accuracy measures are qualitatively 
similar to the results for the main TP accuracy measures. However, controlling for TP revisions, 
analyst country-specialization predicts lower likelihood of a TP being met. Further, for the TP-
revision-adjusted absolute TP error, aTPE_rev, we also find that analysts from large brokerage 
houses issue TPs with smaller absolute forecast error. This confirms that access to a larger pool of 
resources at the broker improves TP accuracy. Together, the results of the TP-revision-adjusted TP 
accuracy measures reinforce the results of the main TP accuracy measures that more skilled analysts 
issue more accurate TPs.  
Inspecting the economic significance of analyst and broker characteristics, we find that 
access to a large resource pool at the broker has the largest standardized effect on Met_any, i.e. a one 
standard deviation increase in ln B_#Ana leads to 6.24% higher likelihood that the stock price will 
meet the target price; analyst firm following has the largest standardized effect on TP forecast error 
(ln A_#Firm=−2.01%). Based on the results in Table 6 we conclude that, on average, analysts with 
higher forecasting experience, following more firms, country-specialized, and employed by a large 
broker issue more accurate TPs. 
 
Do institutional and regulatory characteristics affect target price accuracy? 
Table 6 documents that higher reporting disclosure increases the likelihood that the stock price will 
meet or surpass the target price, and it reduces TP forecast error. The positive relation between 
                                                                
24 In unreported results we follow Sonney (2009) and calculate analyst country-specialization as the Herfindahl 
concentration ratio, which is the sum across countries of the squared ratio of the number of firms followed by the 
analyst in a country over the total number of firms followed by the analyst during the previous 12-months. The 
correlation between the Herfindahl index and A_#Count is 0.92. Repeating the TP accuracy regression in equation (5) 
using the Herfindahl index, we continue to find that TPs issued by country-specialized analysts have lower error but the 
concentration ratio does not correlate with the likelihood that the actual stock price will meet or surpass the target price. 
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disclosure and TP accuracy persists for the two TP-revision-adjusted accuracy measures. This 
confirms that disclosure has a positive effect on TP accuracy (Hope 2003a, 2003b). TPs for 
companies operating in countries with UK origin of the legal system, i.e. countries with the 
shareholder governance model, are more likely to be met over the next twelve months, which 
supports results in Clement et al. (2003). Though weaker, this result is also present for the revision-
adjusted Met_any.  
Cross-country differences in culture explain variation in average TP forecast accuracy. 
Managers in cultures high in uncertainty avoidance may exhibit less risk taking behavior, and prefer 
stability in their operating activities (Bontempo et al. 1997). This simplifies the analyst valuation and 
forecasting task when producing TPs, which explains the positive relation between UDI and our TP 
forecast accuracy measures. Further, Met_any shows a negative correlation with power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity. These cultural dimensions associate with market-orientation of firms, 
high competitiveness of individuals, high secrecy of managers and more difficult access to firm 
management for analysts—characteristics that should associate with higher forecasting difficulty. 
Controlling for disclosure, origin of the country’s legal system, and national culture, enforcement of 
accounting standards and ownership concentration have no effect on TP forecast accuracy. 
Regarding the control variables, we note that better earnings forecasters issue more accurate 
target prices, but analysts who attempt to hype the stock price by forecasting a strong price increase 
issue less accurate TPs.25 Looking at firm characteristics, we observe that TP forecasts for larger 
firms are less likely to be met by the actual stock price, but exhibit lower error. Higher analyst 
coverage increases the likelihood that a target price will be met by the actual stock price, which 
suggests that competition among analysts may incentivize them to exert more effort into producing 
                                                                
25 This reflects that analysts may issue optimistically biased target prices to curry favors with firm management in the 
hope of obtaining a better access to firm management (Lim 2001; Ke and Yu 2006 ) or a future investment banking 
contract (Lin and McNichols 1998; Kolasinski and Kothari 2008). 
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more accurate TPs. However, high analyst competition also increases the average TP forecast error. 
There is a positive relation between price momentum and TP accuracy. In addition, TPs for firms 
with higher stock price volatility are more likely to be met. However, high price volatility also leads 
to higher TP error. The return on the local market index has a strong positive relation with TP 
forecast accuracy, i.e. better ex-post market performance increases TP forecast precision. Finally, we 
find that the unexpected fall in stock prices during the recent financial crisis has on average 
decreased TP accuracy. The effect of the control variables in the accuracy regressions where 
Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev are used is qualitatively similar.  
To sum up, the results from Table 6 suggest that characteristics commonly associated with 
analyst ability, such as experience, the number of firms an analyst follows, country specialization, 
and broker size influence TP forecast accuracy. This confirms that more able analysts produce more 
accurate forecasts of future stock prices. Further, we find support for our prediction that the 
country’s institutional and regulatory setting affects average TP forecast accuracy.26  
 
 
VI. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Instrumental variable regression 
It is possible that analysts may be more optimistic about the prospects of certain firms and, as a 
result, forecast overly high target prices, compared to what their valuation models would dictate.27 
To test for the possibility that TP/P is endogenously determined in the TP accuracy regressions, we 
run a Wald test of exogeneity. We reject the exogeneity of TP/P for all TP accuracy regressions. To 
                                                                
26 Thomson Reuters IBES support team confirm that IBES target price forecasts reflect the analyst projected price level 
at the end of a specific (usually a 12-month) time horizon. However, IBES cannot confirm the exact definition of the 
price target used by each contributing broker. This may affect construct validity of our TP accuracy measures. However, 
any measurement error associated with target prices would work against finding a relation between analyst and 
institutional characteristics and TP forecast accuracy measures. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
27 We discuss potential reasons for why analysts would deviation from the price forecasts suggests by their valuation 
models in footnote 24. 
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assess whether our results are robust controlling for the endogeneity in TP/P, we re-estimate the 
regressions using an instrumental variable (IV) method. This is particularly important as TP/P has 
the largest economic effect on Met_any (TP/P=−45.9%) and on aTPE (TP/P=−44.49%). We use 
the mean TP/P of all forecasts issued by a given analyst in the preceding 12 month period as our 
instrument for the current period TP/P. The past mean TP/P should average out the analyst’s 
(positively and negatively) biased TPs, while it is also unaffected by the current period market 
and/or analyst sentiment.  Larcker and Rusticus (2010) advocate the use of a partial R-square test to 
assess the validity of the instrument, which produces a significant F-test of 867.104 (p-value=0.000), 
and a partial R2 from the first stage regressions of 11.81%. This confirms that the instrument is 
properly specified.  
[Insert Table 7 around here]  
Columns 2SLS of Table 7 report the TP accuracy regression results using the IV estimation 
approach. The results for analyst and broker characteristics from the IV regression are qualitatively 
similar to the basic models in Table 6, and in particular, the coefficients on TP/P remain significant 
and have the correct sign.28 Also, the significance and sign of the coefficients on the institutional and 
regulatory characteristics that explain TP accuracy remain similar. Collectively, the results from the 
IV estimation approach support our main conclusions.  
 
Heterogeneity in analyst forecasting environment across countries  
Our analysis so far assumes that accounting disclosure quality, the enforcement of accounting 
standards, ownership concentration, origin of the legal systems and culture should explain country-
variations in analyst average TP forecast accuracy. To test if the relation between analyst and broker 
characteristics and TP accuracy is sensitive to the specification of controls used for the information 
                                                                
28 For the 2SLS results, we only use analyst-clustered standard errors, which may explain the generally higher coefficient 
significance levels.  
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environment in which firms and analysts operate, we substitute our institutional and regulatory 
characteristics for country dummies. Country effects capture the heterogeneity in the analysts’ 
forecasting environment specific to each country, without identifying the individual factors that 
explain the average cross-country differences in TP accuracy.  
 The Country effects columns of Table 7 report the results for the Met_any and aTPE 
regressions after including country dummies. The results for analyst and broker characteristics 
remain unchanged for both TP accuracy measurers, with the exception of the coefficient on country 
specialization, which becomes insignificant in the aTPE regression. This means that our main 
inferences on the relation between analyst and broker characteristics and TP accuracy are mostly 
unaffected by the specification of the institutional and regulatory characteristics.  
 
The proportional mean absolute TP forecast error 
 
To examine the determinants of EPS forecast accuracy, Clement (1999) uses the proportional mean 
absolute EPS forecast error, which compares the individual analyst’s EPS forecast error to the mean 
forecast error of other analysts following the same firm in a given year. He argues that this increases 
the model’s ability to identify systematic differences in EPS forecasts accuracy relative to a model 
that controls for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Later EPS accuracy studies largely adopted 
this research design. To test if our results are sensitive to using this measure of TP accuracy, we 
construct the mean-adjusted TP error (aTPE_ma), which is the individual TP forecast error scaled by 
the mean TP forecast error of all TP forecasts issued for a firm in a calendar year less one. Higher 
(lower) values of aTPE_ma represent worse (better) than average performance. As in Clement 
(1999), to properly control for firm-year effects we adjust analyst characteristics, EPS forecast error 
and TP/P ratio by subtracting their related firm-year means.  
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 The last columns of Table 7 report the estimates from a TP accuracy regression where 
aTPE_ma is used as the dependent variable. We retain only firm-years with at least five analyst TP 
forecasts, which reduces the sample to 539,118 observations. Analyst experience and broker size 
predict lower relative TP forecast error, similar to Table 6 results. Overall, we conclude that the 
Table 6 results are generally robust to using Clement’s (1999) specification of the forecast accuracy 
measure.  
 
Recency of EPS estimates 
The EPS forecast error in regression model (5) is measured for the most recent EPS forecast issued 
by the analyst for the firm within the past 90 days. For 38% of TP estimates, the EPS forecast issue 
date is earlier than the TP estimate issue date. This means that the relation between analyst 
characteristics and TP forecast accuracy may reflect the accuracy of the latent EPS forecast that the 
analyst would have issued concurrently with the TP estimate. In unreported results we replicate the 
regression analysis presented in Table 6 for a subsample of 362,143 TPs where the accompanying 
EPS forecast was issued on the same date. The results are qualitatively similar to that in Table 6, 
which shows that our results are insensitive to the recency of EPS estimates. 
 
 
VII. PERSISTENCE IN ANALYST TARGET PRICE ACCURACY 
A track record of past TP forecasting accuracy could provide an incremental signal to investors as to 
which contemporaneous TP forecasts are more likely to be ex post accurate. However, in a working 
paper examining whether US analysts have persistent ability in forecasting accurate TPs during 
1997–2002, Bradshaw and Brown (2007) find no evidence that past TP accuracy leads to superior 
current TP accuracy. This section revisits this question. 
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 Panel A of Table 8 presents the prior and current period TP accuracy measures for quintile 
sorts based on the average analyst aTPE in the past year. The sorts are independent for each of the 
16 countries. We observe a positive relation between past TP accuracy and current period TP 
accuracy, both for Met_any and aTPE. Specifically, moving from the lowest to the highest past TP 
accuracy portfolio, Met_any improves by close to 12% (from 53.4% to 59.8%) and aTPE reduces by 
close to 48.6% (from 65.3% to 33.6%).  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
 The first columns of Panel B of Table 8 replicate the main TP accuracy regressions of Table 
6 with the addition of the analyst’s mean prior year aTPE variable (aTPEt-1), which is used to 
measure the analyst’s past TP accuracy. We find that higher past TP error leads to a lower likelihood 
of the current TP being met, and results in a higher current TP error. Analyst and broker 
characteristics have a similar predictive power as in Table 6, with the exception of the size of analyst 
brokerage house, which has a positive effect on the TP forecast error. Also, the signs and 
significance of institutional and regulatory characteristics are similar to that in Table 6, but for 
disclosure, which does not influence the TP forecast error.  
 Why do our results differ from Bradshaw and Brown (2007)? The sample of target prices in 
Bradshaw and Brown (2007) is heavily weighted in TPs issued after 2000 (i.e. 64.5% of TPs in their 
sample). The price depression following the burst of the internet bubble had a strong negative effect 
on accuracy of TP forecasts issued after 2000 that is evident in their Table 3, which shows an 
increase in TP forecast error from 21% in the second half of 1999 to 41.2% in the first half of 2000. 
A similar price shock occurred over our sample period following the subprime mortgage crash, 
which allows us to test if findings in Bradshaw and Brown (2007) are due to the unexpected price 
fall starting in March 2000. The last columns of Panel B of Table 8 repeat the TP accuracy 
regressions when we include the analyst’s mean prior year aTPE, and an interaction term between 
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aTPEt-1 and the financial crisis dummy. The coefficient on aTPEt-1*Fin cris is significant for both 
Met_any and aTPE regressions but with the opposite sign to that on aTPEt-1. This confirms that the 
price shock in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble may explain the findings in Bradshaw and 
Brown (2007).29 
In unreported results, instead of aTPEt-1 we use the residuals from within country and 
industry regressions of the past TP forecast error on the past EPS forecast error. This is because the 
relation between the concurrent and past TP forecast accuracy may reflect analysts’ persistent ability 
to forecast accurate earnings. Including the residuals from the past TP forecast accuracy regressions 
leaves our inferences intact. Further, the results in Table 8 persist when we use the prior year mean 
Met_any measure, and the TP-revision-adjusted accuracy measures as proxies for prior period TP 
accuracy. In addition, estimating the regressions from Table 8 only for US firms generates 
qualitatively similar results. Overall, we conclude that higher TP accuracy in the past year predicts 
higher contemporaneous TP forecast precision, consistent with analysts exhibiting persistent ability 
to issue accurate target prices. 
 
 
VIII. TP FORECAST ACCURACY AFTER THE MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION 
Fourteen countries in our sample implemented IFRS starting from January 2005. The 
implementation of IFRS was anticipated to increase cross-country comparability and transparency of 
accounting disclosure, and result in higher quality information about firm performance becoming 
available to analysts and investors. Subsequently, better quality inputs into analyst valuation models 
                                                                
29 The differences in our results compared to Bradshaw and Brown (2007) may also be due to us using (1) a more 
comprehensive set of control variables, and (2) a more recent sample period. For the former, we find that for TPs issued 
for US firms only, the coefficient on past TP accuracy is lower by 14.3% for the Met_any regression and by 6.4% for 
aTPE regression when we use the accuracy model specification in Bradshaw and Brown (2007) compared to our model 
specification. For the latter, we believe that the NASD 2711 regulation and the SEC rule 472 introduced in the wake of 
the Enron and World.com accounting scandals and the burst of the internet bubble may have motivated analysts to exert 
more effort to produce more accurate TP forecasts. 
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should lead to an improvement in analyst TP forecast accuracy. The question whether the adoption 
of IFRS has improved analysts’ ability to issue more accurate TPs remains unanswered so far.30 
In unreported results we repeat the TP accuracy regressions in equation (5) for the 14 IFRS 
adopting countries, after including analyst past TP accuracy and an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the TP and the EPS forecasts are issued for a fiscal year after the IFRS mandatory adoption date, 
and zero otherwise. We find that the mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the TP forecast error, but 
has no effect on the likelihood that a target price is met by the actual price over the 12-month 
forecast period. The results remain unchanged when we re-estimated the regressions after including 
an interaction term between the EPS forecast error and the IFRS dummy. This is because 
controlling for the effect of financial crisis, the mean aEPS reduces by 0.75% after IFRS adoption, 
and the IFRS dummy, had it not been also interacted, may simply be capturing the lower EPS 
forecast error after the mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Overall, we conclude that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has improved analysts’ ability to 
forecast accurate TPs, which complements previous evidence on the effect that IFRS has had on 
EPS forecast accuracy. We attribute this finding to the higher comparability of financial statement 
information across firms and countries after the IFRS adoption, which is likely to have aided the 
analyst’s valuation task. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
This study adds important international evidence to the fledging literature on the properties of 
analyst research outputs other than EPS forecasts. Using target prices from 16 countries—including 
the US, 12 European countries, Japan, Australia and Hong Kong—we examine if analysts have 
                                                                
30 To date, there is limited evidence about how the mandatory IFRS adoption has affected analysts’ EPS forecast 
accuracy. Byard et al. (2011) and Preiato et al. (2010) find a reduction in the EPS forecast error and forecast dispersion 
following the adoption of IFRS for 20 and 13 European countries respectively. Horton and Serafeim (2010) extend this 
evidence outside the EU market. 
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differential and persistent ability to forecast accurate target prices, controlling for the accuracy of 
their concurrent EPS forecasts. First, we show that TP accuracy exceeds that of naïve price forecasts 
formed by extrapolating past stock performance. Second, we find that analyst past TP accuracy, 
forecasting experience, the number of firms an analyst follows, country specialization, and broker 
size predict TP forecast accuracy. We also document that a country’s institutional and regulatory 
setting has an effect on TP accuracy. Factors such the accounting disclosure quality, the corporate 
governance system, cultural traits, and IFRS regulation explain cross-country differences in TP 
forecast accuracy.  
Our evidence that analysts have differential and persistent skill to issue accurate TP forecasts 
stands in strong contrast to early claims made by the popular press about analysts’ opportunistic use 
of target prices and low TP forecast accuracy—with headlines such as “‘Price Targets are Hazardous 
to Investors’ Wealth’’ (New York Times 08/06/2001) or ‘‘Forget Analysts’ Price Targets. They’re 
Really Just for Show’’ (Forbes 12/11/2000) dominating the press. This study responds to a call by 
Ramnath et al. (2008, 68), who in a comprehensive review of the analyst forecasting literature 
emphasize that “further research is required to describe the behavior of the forecasts that have 
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Appendix I. An example illustrating calculations of TP forecast accuracy measures 
 
The below example illustrates how we calculate the four TP forecast accuracy measures used in the 
study. Further, we discuss the four TP accuracy measures when the direction of the new TP forecast 
differs from the preceding TP. 
 
A simple illustration of the four TP accuracy measures 
Assume that on 12th June 2006, an analyst issues a target price of USD110 for the IBM stock. The 
target price has a 12-month forecast horizon and the closing stock price on 12th June 2006 is 
USD77. Over the next 12-months, IBM’s stock price reaches a high of USD113.5 and a low of 
USD73. The closing price on 12th June 2007 is USD109. The values for the two main TP accuracy 
measures are: Met_any=1 as the actual stock price met and surpassed the target price at some point 
over the 12 months after the TP forecast issue date, and aTPE=|USD110−USD109|/ 
USD77=1.30%.  
 
Further, assume that on 20th March 2007, the analyst issues a new target price for IBM of USD117. 
The new target price has a 12-month forecast horizon and the closing price on 20th March 2007 is 
USD104.5USD. The high and low price between 12th June 2006 and 20th March 2007 are 111USD 
and 73USD respectively. The revision-adjusted target prices are: Met_any_rev=1 as the actual stock 
price has met and surpassed the target price of 110USD at some point between 12th June 2006 and 
20th March 2007, and aTPE_rev=|110−104.5|/77=7.14%. 
 
The four TP accuracy measures when the direction of the new forecast differs from the 
preceding TP. 
Alternatively, assume that the new TP forecast issued on 20th March 2007 projects a USD60 for IBM 
stock price in 12-months. The closing price on 20th March 2007 is again 104.37USD, but the actual 
price on 12th June 2007 is USD57. The high and low price between 12th June 2006 and 20th March 
2007 are 111.2USD and 73.57USD respectively.  In this scenario, Met_any, Met_any_rev, and 
aTPE_rev remain unchanged, however, aTPE increases from 1.3% to 68.83%. The latter result 
wrongly indicates poor analyst forecasting ability as the analyst correctly predicted a stock price 










1.        Dependent variables: TP forecast accuracy measures 
Met_any 
An indicator variable equal to one if the actual stock price reaches the target price, TP, at any time 
over the 12 month period after the TP forecast issue, and zero otherwise. The TP forecast and 
actual stock prices are expressed in the IBES default reporting currency for the firm effective at 
the TP forecast issue date.  
aTPE 
The absolute difference between the TP forecast and the stock price at the end of the 12-month 
forecast period, P12, scaled by the stock price at the forecast issue date, Pst. The TP forecast and 
actual stock prices are expressed in the IBES default reporting currency for the firm effective at 
the time. 
Met_any_rev 
An indicator variable equal to one if the actual stock price reaches the target price, TP, at any time 
between the TP forecast issue date and the subsequent TP forecast revision date, and zero 
otherwise. If a TP forecast has not been revised over the 12-month forecast horizon, Met_any_rev= 
Met_any. The TP forecast and actual stock prices are expressed in the IBES default reporting 
currency for the firm effective at the TP forecast issue date. 
aTPE_rev 
The absolute difference between the TP forecast and the stock price on the TP forecast revision 
date subsequent to the TP forecast issue, Prev, scaled by the stock price at the forecast issue date, Pst. 
If a TP forecast has not been revised over the 12-month forecast horizon, aTPE_rev= aTPE. The 
TP forecast and actual stock prices are expressed in the IBES default reporting currency for the 
firm effective at the TP forecast issue date. 
2.        Independent variables: Analyst and broker characteristics 
A_exp  The number of years an analyst has issued at least one EPS forecasts for a given firm. 
A_#Firm  
The number of companies for which an analyst issued at least one EPS forecast over the previous 
12 months. 
A_#Count  
The number of countries where the firms followed by the analyst are domiciled in. A firm is 
followed by the analyst if the analyst has issued at least one EPS forecasts for a given firm over the 
previous 12 months.  
B_#Ana  
The number of analysts at the broker that issued at least one EPS forecast in the previous 12 
months. 
3.        Independent variables: Institutional and regulatory characteristics 
Disclosure  
The index of accounting disclosure quality based on aggregate annual financial statement 
disclosure scores from CIFAR (1993, 1995). The index ranges between 0 (lowest disclosure) to 1 
(highest disclosure). Sourced from Hope (2003b). 
Enforcement 
The index of enforcement of accounting standards. The index is based on the factor analysis of (1) 
country-level audit spending, (2) judicial efficiency, (3) rule of law, (4) insider trading laws, and (5) 
shareholder protection. Higher values reflect stronger enforcement. Sourced from Hope (2003b). 
Owner con  
Ownership concentration index, which is the median proportion of common shares owned by the 
three largest shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. Sourced from La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
Legor UK 
An indicator variable that equals one if the country’s legal system originates from the English 
common law system, and zero otherwise. Sourced from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Legor GE 
An indicator variable that equals one if the country’s legal system originates from the German civil 
law system, and zero otherwise. Sourced from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Legor FR 
An indicator variable that equals one if the country’s legal system originates from the French civil 
law system, and zero otherwise. Sourced from La Porta et al. (1998). 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Legor SC 
An indicator variable that equals one if the country’s legal system originates from the Scandinavian 
civil law system, and zero otherwise. Sourced from La Porta et al. (1998). 
PDI 
Power distance. The extent to which a society accepts unequal distribution of power. Sourced 
from www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
IDV 
Individualism. The degree to which individuals are encouraged to be independent and self-reliant. 
Sourced from www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
UAI 
Uncertainty avoidance. The degree to which people prefer structured and predictable events over 
unstructured and uncertain events. Sourced from www.geert-
hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
MAS 
Masculinity. The degree to which individuals in a society are driven by competition, achievement 
and success. Sourced from www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
4.        Independent variables: TP and EPS forecast characteristics 
aEPS 
The absolute difference between the actual and forecasted EPS scaled by stock price at the end of 
the previous fiscal year. The actual and forecasted EPS, and the stock price are expressed in the 
IBES default reporting currency for the firm effective at the EPS forecast issue date. 
TP/P  
The ratio of target price to actual price on the forecast issue date less one. Both the TP and the 
actual stock price are expressed in the IBES default reporting currency for the firm effective at the 
TP forecast issue date. 
5.        Independent variables: Firm characteristics 
MV  Firm market capitalization measured at the TP forecast issue date and expressed in USD million. 
F_#Ana  The number of analysts issuing at least one EPS forecasts for a firm over the previous 12 months. 
MOM Buy-and-hold stock returns for 90-days prior to the forecast issue date. 
COV  
Stock price standard deviation over 90-days prior to the forecast issue date scaled by the mean 
price level over this period.   
 
6.        Independent variables: Other controls 
Mkt ret 
The return on the leading market index for the primary exchange where the firm’s stock lists 
over 12 months after the forecast issue date.  
Fin cris 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the forecast is issued after 1st September 2007 and zero 
otherwise. 
Year dummies Year dummy variables. 
Industry dummies Ten industry dummies based on the sector code from IBES SIG code. 
Mkt dummies Country dummy variables. 
   
The table presents the definitions of the main variables used in the study. We divide the variables into six categories: 
(1) TP forecast accuracy measures, (2) analyst and broker characteristics, (3) institutional and regulatory 























No TP  No TP (%)   No firms  No firms (%)  No brokers  No brokers (%)    No analysts  No analysts (%)   
Australia  24852  4.2%  657  6.6%  72  11.8%  680  5.3% 
Austria  2546  0.4%  59  0.6%  68  11.0%  361  2.8% 
Belgium  4407  0.8%  105  1.1%  58  9.3%  477  3.7% 
Denmark  5036  0.9%  90  0.9%  63  10.1%  394  3.1% 
Finland  8649  1.5%  114  1.1%  101  16.3%  512  4.0% 
France  26103  4.5%  446  4.5%  155  25.0%  1883  14.7% 
Germany  24239  4.1%  400  4.0%  131  21.1%  1573  12.3% 
Hong Kong  22729  3.9%  409  4.1%  79  12.7%  1199  9.4% 
Italy  10711  1.8%  220  2.2%  69  11.1%  791  6.2% 
Japan  41316  7.1%  1221  12.2%  47  7.6%  905  7.1% 
Netherlands  11994  2.0%  163  1.6%  148  23.8%  1003  7.8% 
Spain  9252  1.6%  132  1.3%  65  10.5%  708  5.5% 
Sweden  12953  2.2%  202  2.0%  104  16.7%  754  5.9% 
Switzerland  12593  2.2%  198  2.0%  132  21.3%  914  7.1% 
United Kingdom 44996  7.7%  1117  11.2%  190  30.6%  2240  17.5% 
United States  323342  55.2%  4472  44.8%  324  52.2%  5040  39.4% 
Total 585718  
 
 9982  
 
 621  
 
 12792  
 
The table presents the distribution of target prices, sample firms, brokerage houses and analysts across 16 countries. No TP stands for the number of target prices. 





 Summary statistics of target price accuracy measures 
      
Panel A: Mean values of TP forecast accuracy measures 
 
 
Main TP forecast  
accuracy measures 
Alternative TP forecast  
accuracy measures 
     
 
N Met_any (%) aTPE (%) Met_any_rev (%) aTPE_rev (%) 
           
Australia  24852 66.1% 47.4% 45.4% 35.6% 
Austria  2546 59.8% 50.6% 46.3% 37.6% 
Belgium  4407 59.1% 40.6% 43.9% 31.2% 
Denmark  5036 56.1% 58.2% 40.7% 47.3% 
Finland  8649 62.2% 44.1% 46.4% 30.0% 
France  26103 58.3% 38.7% 42.6% 30.5% 
Germany  24239 60.8% 44.3% 44.4% 35.0% 
Hong Kong  22729 64.3% 48.4% 47.1% 36.0% 
Italy  10711 54.0% 38.3% 41.2% 31.6% 
Japan  41316 59.1% 37.3% 47.0% 30.9% 
Netherlands  11994 59.1% 37.9% 42.8% 31.2% 
Spain  9252 60.2% 39.4% 43.5% 33.9% 
Sweden  12953 58.6% 47.5% 42.8% 34.9% 
Switzerland  12593 55.8% 45.4% 39.0% 37.4% 
United Kingdom 44996 57.5% 47.8% 43.3% 40.8% 
United States  323342 54.7% 49.5% 38.5% 44.8% 
Average   59.1% 44.7% 43.4% 35.5% 
Panel B: TP accuracy over time 
2002 13397 51.7% 51.9% 37.0% 43.4% 
2003 55627 58.7% 47.0% 41.3% 38.6% 
2004 71176 53.8% 41.0% 36.1% 37.1% 
2005 76067 62.0% 37.0% 41.9% 32.1% 
2006 84237 63.2% 35.1% 41.7% 30.6% 
2007 93770 50.2% 49.8% 36.1% 44.5% 
2008 126561 48.0% 56.1% 35.3% 53.6% 
2009 64883 72.8% 56.8% 64.0% 35.1% 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients between TP accuracy measures 
 
Met_any aTPE Met_any_rev aTPE_rev 




   





aTPE_rev -0.331 0.744 -0.243 1 
  0.000 0.000 0.000   
     
The table presents the summary statistics of the target price accuracy measures. Panel A presents the mean values 
for the four TP accuracy measures expressed in %.  Met_any equals one if the actual stock price reaches the target 
price at any time over the 12-month forecast period and zero otherwise. aTPE is the absolute target price forecast 
error. Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev are the TP-revision-adjusted target price forecast accuracy measures. Panel B 
presents the annual TP forecast accuracy values in %. Panel C presents the Pearson correlation coefficients 





Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
Panel A: Analyst and broker characteristics 
  
  A_exp A_#firm A_#Count B_#Ana 
  
       
Australia  2.794 10.757 1.242 88.404 
Austria  2.254 7.621 2.184 116.405 
Belgium  2.705 7.567 2.219 92.756 
Denmark  2.780 6.769 1.874 90.428 
Finland  2.955 9.423 1.913 89.716 
France  2.946 8.929 2.176 111.540 
Germany  2.862 8.751 2.065 95.879 
Hong Kong  2.517 8.679 1.345 95.410 
Italy  2.557 8.450 1.665 95.128 
Japan  3.532 13.834 1.029 94.557 
Netherlands 2.927 9.294 2.342 100.713 
Spain  2.465 8.950 1.959 103.236 
Sweden  3.007 8.262 2.098 101.835 
Switzerland  3.024 9.066 2.169 106.309 
United Kingdom 2.791 10.165 1.993 125.905 
United States  3.219 14.318 1.266 68.582 
Average 2.833 9.427 1.846 98.550 
 




TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
  
Panel B: Institutional and regulatory characteristics 
 
Disclosure Enforcement Owner_con Legor UK Legor GE Legor FR Legor SC PDI IDV UAI MAS 
                        
Australia  0.806 -0.250 0.280 1 0 0 0 36 90 51 61 
Austria  0.607 -1.650 0.510 0 1 0 0 11 55 70 79 
Belgium  0.695 -1.890 0.620 0 0 1 0 65 75 94 54 
Denmark  0.729 -0.560 0.400 0 0 0 1 18 74 23 16 
Finland  0.810 -0.220 0.340 0 0 0 1 33 63 59 26 
France  0.770 -0.990 0.240 0 0 1 0 68 71 86 43 
Germany  0.678 -2.920 0.500 0 1 0 0 35 67 65 66 
Hong Kong  0.730 0.100 0.540 1 0 0 0 68 25 29 57 
Italy  0.680 -3.550 0.600 0 0 1 0 50 76 75 70 
Japan  0.709 0.160 0.130 0 1 0 0 54 46 92 95 
Netherlands 0.732 -0.190 0.310 0 0 1 0 38 80 53 14 
Spain  0.697 -3.650 0.500 0 0 1 0 57 51 86 42 
Sweden  0.830 0.550 0.280 0 0 0 1 31 71 29 5 
Switzerland  0.761 -0.390 0.480 0 1 0 0 34 68 58 70 
United Kingdom 0.831 1.160 0.150 1 0 0 0 35 89 35 66 
United States  0.738 1.210 0.120 1 0 0 0 40 91 46 62 
Average 0.738 -0.818 0.375 0.250 0.250 0.313 0.188 42.063 68.250 59.438 51.625 
51 
 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Other explanatory variables           
  TP/P (%) MV ($) F_#Ana MOM COV Mkt ret Fin_cris 
                
Australia  19.1% 4811.0 11.574 -0.006 0.082 0.071 0.451 
Austria  17.2% 6472.4 14.328 -0.028 0.096 0.074 0.559 
Belgium  9.1% 11246.6 16.088 -0.012 0.069 0.032 0.455 
Denmark  19.8% 6368.1 15.428 -0.020 0.082 0.058 0.573 
Finland  11.6% 8168.0 17.583 -0.019 0.076 0.012 0.487 
France  16.0% 13447.8 17.868 -0.009 0.070 0.027 0.438 
Germany  16.6% 12239.8 18.901 -0.013 0.085 0.081 0.493 
Hong Kong  14.2% 6673.6 16.980 0.048 0.080 0.150 0.269 
Italy  13.7% 12148.8 16.834 -0.026 0.075 -0.033 0.547 
Japan  14.6% 8265.3 13.559 -0.018 0.078 -0.016 0.410 
Netherlands  14.2% 12861.8 18.177 -0.001 0.071 0.051 0.350 
Spain  16.7% 14027.1 18.681 0.004 0.064 0.084 0.409 
Sweden  13.6% 7810.6 16.873 0.012 0.078 0.102 0.528 
Switzerland  22.4% 17361.1 17.461 -0.006 0.069 0.044 0.448 
United Kingdom 15.5% 10724.2 15.864 0.001 0.075 0.048 0.446 
United States  19.7% 7967.5 15.417 0.004 0.085 0.043 0.328 
Average 15.9% 10037.1 16.351 -0.006 0.077 0.052 0.450 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables related to analyst TP forecast accuracy. Panel 
A presents the mean values of the independent variables related to analyst and broker characteristics, and institutional 
and regulatory characteristics. We calculate averages at TP forecast level (i.e. using characteristics measured at each 
TP forecast issue). A_exp is analyst firm-specific forecasting experience, A_#firm is the number of firms the analyst 
follows, A_#Count measures in how many countries the firms that an analyst follows are located, and B_#Ana is the 
number of analysts employed by a broker. Panel B shows the mean values for institutional and regulatory 
characteristics. Disclosure is the country’s accounting disclosure quality index, Enforcement is the accounting 
enforcement index, and Owner con is the ownership concentration index. Legor UK, Legor GE, Legor FR and Legor SC 
reflect the respective English, German, French and Scandinavian origin of the legal system. PDI is power distance, 
IDV stands for individualism, UAI for uncertainty avoidance, and MAS for masculinity. Panel C presents the mean 
values for the remaining explanatory variables. TP/P is the ratio of target price to actual price at the forecast issue 
date less one expressed in %. MV ($) is the firm market capitalization at the TP forecast issue date expressed in USD 
million, F_#Ana is the number of analysts following a firm. MOM is buy-and-hold return for 90-days before the TP 
issue date, and COV is the (standardized) stock price variation. Mkt ret is the market index return over 12-months 












Accuracy of analyst TP forecasts compared to the accuracy of naïve price forecasts 
 
 
Met_any≥naïve Met_any aTPE − sim_aTPE Met_any_rev≥naïve Met_any_rev aTPE_rev − sim_aTPE_rev 
        
 
Mean p Mean p Mean p Mean p 
                 
Australia  0.789 0.000 -0.182 0.000 0.691 0.000 -0.152 0.000 
Austria  0.736 0.000 -0.184 0.000 0.663 0.000 -0.174 0.000 
Belgium  0.727 0.000 -0.058 0.000 0.668 0.000 -0.076 0.000 
Denmark  0.710 0.000 0.004 0.691 0.629 0.000 0.013 0.302 
Finland  0.787 0.000 -0.146 0.000 0.709 0.000 -0.173 0.000 
France  0.748 0.000 -0.106 0.000 0.684 0.000 -0.109 0.000 
Germany  0.764 0.000 -0.133 0.000 0.696 0.000 -0.133 0.000 
Hong Kong  0.816 0.000 -0.199 0.000 0.744 0.000 -0.199 0.000 
Italy  0.677 0.000 -0.044 0.000 0.624 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
Japan  0.743 0.000 -0.093 0.000 0.683 0.000 -0.084 0.000 
Netherlands  0.751 0.000 -0.116 0.000 0.684 0.000 -0.109 0.000 
Spain  0.731 0.000 -0.018 0.003 0.672 0.000 -0.021 0.003 
Sweden  0.755 0.000 -0.142 0.000 0.686 0.000 -0.136 0.000 
Switzerland  0.742 0.000 -0.040 0.000 0.685 0.000 -0.041 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.733 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.005 0.160 
United States  0.713 0.000 -0.101 0.000 0.627 0.000 -0.040 0.000 
Average 0.745 0.000 -0.098 0.043 0.677 0.000 -0.092 0.029 
The table compares the accuracy of analyst target prices to the accuracy of naïve price forecasts that extrapolate past firm performance into the future. The naïve 
price forecast predicts that the stock price in twelve months will be equal to the stock price at the forecast release date times one plus the previous 12-month buy-
and-hold return. We calculate Met_any and aTPE, and Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev equivalents of the naïve price forecast, i.e. naive Met_any and naive aTPE, and naive 
Met_any_rev and naive aTPE_rev. The Met_any≥naïve Met_any columns present the average proportion of TP forecasts that meet or exceed the accuracy of naïve price 
forecasts based on the Met_any accuracy measure. The aTPE − naïve aTPE columns present the average difference between the absolute TP error and the error of 
the naïve price forecast. Columns Met_any_rev≥naïve Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev − sim_aTPE_rev replicate the analysis for Met_any_rev and aTPE_rev.  p is the p-value 







Analyst target price accuracy regressions 
  
Main TP accuracy measures TP accuracy measures adjusted for TP forecast revisions 
        
  
Met_any aTPE Met_any_rev aTPE_rev 
  
        
 
Exp.sign Est St.Eff p Est St.Eff p Est p Est p 
 







0.000 0.347 0.358 0.502 0.000 
ln A_exp +/- 0.001 0.08% 0.912 -0.008 -1.88% 0.000 -0.010 0.350 -0.008 0.000 
ln A_#Firm ?/? 0.039 2.49% 0.005 -0.009 -2.01% 0.000 0.022 0.088 -0.007 0.000 
ln A_#Count -/+ -0.001 -0.02% 0.982 0.006 0.95% 0.057 0.048 0.019 0.011 0.000 
ln B_#Ana +/- 0.058 6.24% 0.000 -0.000 -0.02% 0.946 0.040 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
Disclosure +/- 1.878 7.31% 0.000 -0.120 -1.69% 0.057 1.545 0.000 -0.283 0.000 
Enforcement +/- 0.002 0.21% 0.962 0.003 1.30% 0.564 -0.003 0.914 0.001 0.827 
Owner con -/+ 0.350 5.11% 0.257 0.017 0.88% 0.706 -0.160 0.521 -0.062 0.142 
Legor GE -/+ -0.284 -9.80% 0.002 -0.010 -1.28% 0.416 -0.163 0.034 0.011 0.308 
Legor FR -/+ -0.374 -11.54% 0.001 -0.007 -0.77% 0.699 0.026 0.783 0.023 0.176 
Legor SC -/+ -0.485 -10.11% 0.000 0.010 0.76% 0.575 -0.227 0.031 0.024 0.183 
PDI -/+ -0.009 -8.58% 0.002 0.000 1.15% 0.445 -0.010 0.000 0.001 0.051 
IDV -/+ -0.007 -13.15% 0.000 0.000 0.82% 0.658 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.196 
UAI +/- 0.012 20.35% 0.000 -0.001 -5.75% 0.019 0.006 0.003 -0.002 0.000 
MAS -/+ -0.004 -6.89% 0.018 0.000 0.41% 0.811 0.002 0.236 0.000 0.207 
aEPS -/+ -1.625 -6.55% 0.000 0.745 10.84% 0.000 -1.190 0.000 0.571 0.000 
TP/P -/+ -0.964 -45.90% 0.000 0.259 44.49% 0.000 -1.246 0.000 0.333 0.000 
ln MV +/- -0.117 -19.30% 0.000 -0.017 -10.36% 0.000 -0.155 0.000 -0.010 0.000 
ln F_#Ana +/- 0.146 9.20% 0.000 0.016 3.66% 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.006 0.036 
MOM ?/? 0.304 7.40% 0.000 -0.010 -0.88% 0.068 0.273 0.000 -0.003 0.560 
COV +/+ 2.290 14.16% 0.000 0.476 10.61% 0.000 2.155 0.000 0.303 0.000 
Mkt ret +/- 1.701 39.98% 0.000 -0.129 -10.97% 0.000 2.521 0.000 -0.423 0.000 









































R2   6.40%     31.87%     7.42%   40.55%   
The table shows the coefficient estimates (Est) from the analyst TP accuracy regressions in Equation (5). Exp.sign shows the predicted direction of the relation, and p 
are p-values based on analyst- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009). St.Eff are the standardized coefficients when variables are standardized so that 
their variances equal one. The Met_any columns present the results from the logit model predicting the likelihood that the stock price will meet the target price at any 
time over the 12-month forecast period.  




TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
Column aTPE present the results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the absolute TP forecast error in log form, aTPE. Columns Met_any_rev and 
aTPE_rev show results for the TP forecast accuracy measures Met_any and aTPE that account for the TP forecast revisions before the end of the 12-month forecast 
period. aTPE_rev is used in log form. The explanatory variables are described in Table 1 and ln indicates a logarithmic transformation of a variable. N is the number 





Robustness analysis for analyst target price accuracy regressions 
 
2SLS Country effect  
 
      
 
Met_any  aTPE Met_any_rev aTPE_rev Met_any aTPE aTPE_ma 
 
              
 
Est p Est p Est p Est p Est p Est p Est p 
 
                            
Intercept 0.008 0.961 0.408 0.000 0.243 0.104 0.492 0.000 0.605 0.000 0.317 0.000 -0.000 1.000 
ln A_exp 0.010 0.136 -0.011 0.000 0.005 0.429 -0.010 0.000 -0.001 0.963 -0.008 0.000 -0.015 0.000 
ln A_#Firm 0.027 0.005 -0.012 0.000 0.016 0.076 -0.009 0.000 0.038 0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.380 
ln A_#Count -0.006 0.649 0.007 0.004 0.026 0.024 0.011 0.000 0.018 0.425 0.003 0.300 0.003 0.596 
ln B_#Ana 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.670 0.027 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.059 0.000 -0.000 0.780 -0.004 0.020 
Disclosure 1.060 0.000 -0.054 0.087 0.865 0.000 -0.233 0.000 
    
 
 
Enforcement 0.004 0.713 0.003 0.154 -0.000 0.962 0.000 0.794 
    
 
 
Owner con 0.242 0.009 0.017 0.311 -0.079 0.344 -0.065 0.000 
      
Legor GE -0.179 0.000 -0.009 0.157 -0.110 0.001 0.015 0.010 
      
Legor FR -0.294 0.000 -0.002 0.811 -0.042 0.296 0.032 0.000 
      
Legor SC -0.342 0.000 0.002 0.795 -0.174 0.000 0.022 0.012 
      
PDI -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.344 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 
      
IDV -0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.868 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.044 
      
UAI 0.008 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
      
MAS -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.004 
      
aEPS -1.159 0.000 0.798 0.000 -0.894 0.000 0.606 0.000 -1.645 0.000 0.745 0.000 0.920 0.000 
TP/P -0.528 0.000 0.233 0.000 -0.676 0.000 0.316 0.000 -0.965 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.499 0.000 
ln MV -0.071 0.000 -0.018 0.000 -0.095 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.117 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
  
ln F_#Ana 0.086 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.016 0.000 
  
MOM 0.199 0.000 -0.021 0.000 0.197 0.000 -0.009 0.025 0.307 0.000 -0.011 0.053 
  
COV 1.271 0.000 0.470 0.000 1.204 0.000 0.311 0.000 2.292 0.000 0.477 0.000 
  
Mkt ret 1.008 0.000 -0.148 0.000 1.411 0.000 -0.433 0.000 1.710 0.000 -0.132 0.000 
  
Fin_cris -0.063 0.000 0.072 0.000 -0.003 0.863 0.043 0.000 -0.081 0.013 0.076 0.000 
  
























































R2                 6.44%   31.92%   3.24%   
This table presents the results of sensitivity analysis for the TP accuracy regressions. Est are the coefficient estimates and p are p-values based on analyst- and firm-
clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009), and for analyst-clustered standard errors for 2SLS regression. Columns 2SLS presents the results from instrumental 
variable regressions for Met_any and Met_any_rev. The Country effect columns present the results for TP accuracy regressions where we substitute the institutional and 
regulatory characteristics for country dummies.  




TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Columns aTPE_ma present the results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the mean-adjusted TP forecast error, aTPE_ma. For aTPE_ma 
regression, we adjust analyst characteristics, EPS forecast error and TP/P ratio by subtracting their related firm-year means. Variable definitions are in Table 1 and 




Persistence in analyst target price forecasting ability 
Panel A: Quintile sorts on past TP accuracy  
  
 
N aTPEt-1 (%) Met_any (%) aTPE (%) 
 
   
     
aTPEt-1 1 96547 0.881 0.534 0.653 
aTPEt-1 2 96479 0.523 0.559 0.523 
aTPEt-1 3 96361 0.396 0.573 0.449 
aTPEt-1 4 96411 0.292 0.571 0.392 
aTPEt-1 5 96219 0.172 0.598 0.336 
p(aTPEt-1 1 − aTPEt-1 5)   0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Persistence in analyst ability to issue accurate target prices 
 
Met_any aTPE Met_any aTPE 
 
        
 
Est p Est p Est p Est p 
 
                 
Intercept 0.364 0.466 0.325 0.000 0.366 0.463 0.324 0.000 
aTPEt-1 -0.297 0.000 0.082 0.000 -0.384 0.000 0.090 0.000 
aTPEt-1*Fin_cris 
    
0.298 0.000 -0.027 0.002 
ln A_exp 0.011 0.381 -0.010 0.000 0.012 0.323 -0.010 0.000 
ln A_#Firm 0.034 0.052 -0.009 0.000 0.034 0.050 -0.009 0.000 
ln A_#Count -0.000 0.993 0.005 0.105 -0.000 0.996 0.005 0.105 
ln B_#Ana 0.052 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.052 0.000 0.002 0.008 
Disclosure 1.612 0.000 -0.023 0.716 1.578 0.000 -0.020 0.754 
Enforcement 0.010 0.782 0.002 0.628 0.010 0.785 0.002 0.625 
Owner con 0.415 0.210 0.018 0.678 0.417 0.207 0.018 0.681 
Legor GE -0.309 0.002 -0.007 0.586 -0.311 0.002 -0.007 0.598 
Legor FR -0.494 0.000 0.002 0.912 -0.497 0.000 0.002 0.900 
Legor SC -0.558 0.000 0.002 0.930 -0.557 0.000 0.002 0.934 
PDI -0.008 0.009 0.000 0.830 -0.008 0.010 0.000 0.846 
IDV -0.007 0.001 0.000 0.680 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.657 
UAI 0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.028 0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.028 
MAS -0.006 0.004 0.000 0.797 -0.006 0.004 0.000 0.788 
aEPS -1.676 0.000 0.751 0.000 -1.695 0.000 0.753 0.000 
TP/P -1.012 0.000 0.258 0.000 -1.016 0.000 0.258 0.000 
ln MV -0.120 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.119 0.000 -0.017 0.000 
ln F_#Ana 0.138 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.019 0.000 
MOM 0.315 0.000 -0.018 0.002 0.315 0.000 -0.018 0.002 
COV 2.420 0.000 0.410 0.000 2.400 0.000 0.412 0.000 
Mkt ret 1.644 0.000 -0.145 0.000 1.642 0.000 -0.145 0.000 
Fin_cris -0.093 0.009 0.073 0.000 -0.196 0.000 0.083 0.000 
































R2 6.73%   33.38%   6.75%   33.40%   
The table examines the relation between past and current period target price accuracy. Panel A presents the results 
from quintile sorts on mean aTPE for all TP forecasts issued by the analyst in the past calendar year, aTPEt-1. N is the 
number of observations, Met_any equals one if the actual stock price reaches the target price at any time over the 12-
month forecast period and zero otherwise, and aTPE is the absolute target price forecast error. p(aTPEt-1 1 − aTPEt-1 
5) is the p-value for the difference between the two extreme aTPEt-1 quintiles. Mean TP accuracy measures are 
expressed in %. 
 




TABLE 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B presents the regression results (Est) for target price accuracy regressions when we include average past aTPE 
of all forecasts issued by the analyst, aTPEt-1. aTPEt-1*Fin cris is the interaction term between aTPEt-1 and the financial 
crisis dummy. The Met_any columns present the results from the logit model predicting the likelihood that the stock 
price will meet the target price at any time over the 12-month forecast period. The aTPE columns present the results 
from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the absolute TP forecast error in log form, aTPE. p are p-
values based on analyst- and firm-clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009). Variable definitions are in Table 1 and ln 
indicates a logarithmic transformation of a variable. N is the number of observations, p-value is the p-value for model 
specification and R2 is the R-squared. 
 
 
 
 
